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Scientific Theories EssayOne of the major preoccupations of XXs century scientific philosophers was the development of complex scientific possible action explaining how science comes to be and how it works. Since 1900-s several basic theories have been proposed to explain science. This paper aims to provide an overview of those theories especially concentrating on papers of scientific revolution by doubting doubting Thomas S. Kuhn.already David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature noticed, that we loafer never truly prove the existence of casual laws but we tolerate only(prenominal) perceive them and their consequences. And as we can not know the truth about laws, we can never know the law itself, so it is always open for reconsideration. W.V. Quine went even further by proposing, that even mathematical theorems can from time to time be revised if necessary. Thusly they have created grounds for illogical negativism, under which no readment can be recognise absolutely true. In the 1920-s Moritz Schlicks and Hans Reichenbach offered another view which they called logical positivism. Basically recognizing that no statement can be true or fancied a priory, logical positivists held that every piece of knowledge is based on logics of protocol sentences based on observable events. In order to be recognized true or false a statement is to meet a verifiability criterion. Only in this case a statement can be recognized meaningful. However, some of the positivists noticed, that even non-verifiable statements may have some cognitive value1.In the 1930-s Karl Popper raised criticism against positivist model and introduced a theory based on ideas of practicing scientists. Under his idea scientific progress is achieved by rejection of earlier false theories and creation of a new theory when the old one no night grand fits the empiric facts. The new theory is therefore closer to truth. So physics of Aristotle has been replaced by physics of Newton and physics of Ne wton by the one of Einstein. every new theory explains the world in new cost and on a new level,Progressive theory has been sharply criticized by Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962. Under his idea, scientific progress is a set of dominant structures, which he called paradigms. Scientific research passes through stages of shape development including solving of current problems and revolutionary stage. Revolutionary stage or paradigm shift means testing of new theories and assumptions which causes a state of crisis in the old theories, when paradigms are sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity2For Kuhn a new paradigm is not only a new theory, but a totally new view on the world and a new way of thinking. A paradigm is not a new answer to a question, but it is revolutionary new way of putting questions themselves. Core questions of the old paradigm are rejected by a n ew one as those, which are no longer applicable3. Moreover, one paradigm can not be understood in terms of another paradigm, so changing paradigms necessarily causes a crisis.Kuhn explained this using models from astronomy by noticing that Given a particular discrepancy, astronomers were invariably able to eliminate it by making some particular adjustment in Ptolemys system of compounded circles. But astronomys complexity was increasing far much rapidly than its accuracy and that a discrepancy corrected in one place was likely to show up in another.4 Paradigm changes the world itself, and Kuhn offers an example of Lavoisier, who saw nature differently after discovering oxygen5.After scientific revolution has happened, communications are to restored between advocates of new and old theories. This is a hard and long break downing process, which often ends by physical death of the old scientists, because Conversions will occur a few at a time until, after the last hold-outs have die d, the whole profession will again be practicing under a single, but now different, paradigm6.This caused claims of relativism which Kuhn himself denied in the later editions of his book. However, despite of all, Kuhns idea have deeply influenced the modern philosophic vocabulary. Such terms as paradigm, paradigm shift, normal science and revolutionary science are now widely applied by scientists and philosophers, especially in social science, political science and international relations theory7.Among the latest critics one should mention abstract thought by Paul Feyerabend. He noticed, that there were many cases in the history of science, when scientists considered their theories a priory accurate long after some facts are discovered, which demonstrate the impuissance of the theory. Under Feyerabends assumption there exist certain forms of scientific thinking, which allow scholars to recognize certain theories as scientific. So methodology of science can be pluralistic and includ e methods from different periods. New methods of reasoning do not substitute old ones, but they enter the scientific cannon unitedly and mutually influence each other8.Works CitedFriedman, Michael, (1999) Reconsidering synthetical Positivism. Cambridge, UK Cambridge University PressThomas S. Kuhn (1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University Of Chicago Press 3 editionFuller S. (2000) Thomas Kuhn A Philosophical History for Our Times. Chicago University of Chicago PressBird A. (2000) Thomas Kuhn. Princeton and London Princeton University Press and Acumen PressPaul K. Feyerabend (1999) Knowledge, Science and Relativism. Vol. 3, Cambridge1 Friedman, Michael, (1999) Reconsidering Logical Positivism. Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press, p,- 432 Thomas S. Kuhn (1996) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University Of Chicago Press 3 edition, p.-103 Fuller S. (2000) Thomas Kuhn A Philosophical History for Our Times. Chicago University of Chicago Press. p.-704 Thomas S. Kuhn (1996) ibidem, p.-655 Supra note, p.- 1186 Supra note, p.-1527 Bird A. (2000) Thomas Kuhn. Princeton and London Princeton University Press and Acumen Press. p.- 1138 See Paul K. Feyerabend (1999) Knowledge, Science and Relativism. Vol. 3, Cambridge University Press